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IN 2011, I PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE in which I argued that state takeovers
of school districts are the best of the various legal mechanisms avail-
able to school districts in fiscal crisis—better than a general state re-
ceivership, and definitely better than municipal bankruptcy, which is
not even available to school districts in twenty-six states.1 I contended
that takeover mechanisms should be gradual and progressive, provid-
ing a school district with ample notice and opportunity to try to get its
own financial house in order before it is divested of some or all author-
ity over financial matters.2 One of the states I focused on as having a
model takeover statute was my own state, Michigan.3 As that article
was going to press, Michigan changed its emergency financial man-
ager statute drastically, extending the authority of an emergency finan-
cial manager over the local government she or he manages and giving
the governor substantially more autonomy when selecting the individ-
uals whose new title, “emergency managers,” reflected that their author-
ity was no longer limited to financial matters.4 These changes gained
national attention.5
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3. Id. at 925-30, 953-58.
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Michigan citizens’ resistance and challenges to the state’s new emer-
gency manager statute were substantial, sometimes taking place in court-
rooms6 and, in November, 2012, at the ballot box.7 As this paper was
going to press, Michigan enacted yet another emergency manager sta-
tute, and although that statute curtails emergency mangers’ authority in
some respects, it retains many of its predecessor’s shortcomings.8
The question of the proper role of a state in school districts’ fiscal
crises is an important one. Like Michigan, numerous states have been
grappling with that same question—Indiana, Missouri, and Rhode Is-
land, for example.9 Accordingly, learning about what has been happen-
ing in Michigan provides an exceptional opportunity for legislators, at-
torneys, academics, and advocates from across the country to reflect on
how their own states should assist school districts in fiscal crisis, and
when state intervention goes too far.10 Part I of this paper briefly dis-
cusses the various legal mechanisms for state intervention in school dis-
tricts’ and other municipalities’ fiscal crises; it also analyzes Michigan’s
1988, 1990, and 2011 takeover statutes and the litigation and other
public opposition to those statutes. Part II focuses on four substantial
shortcomings contained in Michigan’s 2011 takeover statute, which
was ultimately rescinded by Michigan voters.11
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I. Michigan’s Takeovers of School Districts
The question of if or how states should intervene in local govern-
ments’ fiscal crises has presented itself often in recent years, which
have been financially very challenging times for state and local gov-
ernments including school districts. In 2011, Michigan responded to
this economic situation by modifying one of the legal mechanisms it
makes available to local governments in fiscal crisis: its state takeover
statute.12 Michigan now has three school districts under the control of
an emergency financial manager.13
A. Bankruptcy, Receivership, and State Takeover
Three legal mechanisms that may be available to a local government
in fiscal distress are regulated by the state in which that local govern-
ment entity is located. The first option, a Chapter 9 municipal bank-
ruptcy,14 is a restructuring bankruptcy. It is not a liquidation bank-
ruptcy because school districts, unlike for-profit businesses, cannot
merely wind up their affairs without substantial public impact.15 Bank-
ruptcy is a creature of federal law, and states must explicitly give per-
mission for their local government entities to declare bankruptcy—
only twenty-four states do so, including Michigan.16 A Chapter 9
bankruptcy can be advantageous to a school district because the school
district continues operations while its major expenditures are modi-
fied.17 Bankruptcy courts’ powers are limited due to federalism con-
cerns, and because of this limitation, often a bankruptcy court cannot
require the changes that would address the school district’s underlying
cause of fiscal distress.18 Moreover, bankruptcy is a costly process.
Second, states may have parallel provisions to municipal bank-
ruptcy, generally known as municipal receivership statutes. Only
two states authorize school districts to enter into municipal receiver-
ship.19 The authority of a court-appointed receiver is more far-reaching
than that of a bankruptcy court, but receivership is almost never used.
12. Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 141.1501—.1531 (repealed 2012).
13. Chris Christoff, Michigan Voters Risk Bankrupt Cities With Vote on Managers,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 10, 2012, 10:10 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-10/
michigan-voters-risk-bankrupt-cities-with-vote-on-state-managers.html.
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46 (2006).
15. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 918-20.
16. Id. at 919.
17. Id. at 922.
18. Id. at 921-22.
19. Id. at 923. These states are Kentucky and Pennsylvania. Id.
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Receivership requires substantial expenditures by a school district due
to the judicial nature of the mechanism and, moreover, receivership in-
volves procedures often more stringent than a school district needs.20
Neither federal bankruptcy nor state judicial receivership were designed
for school districts, thus it is not entirely surprising that those options
are not a solid fit for addressing school districts’ fiscal crises.
The third and final legal mechanism available to school districts in
fiscal crisis is a state takeover mechanism.21 Although general munic-
ipalities can be subject to state takeovers, statutes usually regulate the
takeover of school districts separately from the takeover of other mu-
nicipalities. Thirty-three states permit a state takeover of a school dis-
trict for academic and/or fiscal reasons.22 The most comprehensive
statutes: (1) specify factors that trigger various levels of state involve-
ment, (2) contain a series of escalating types of state involvement with
a takeover being the most extreme form of state involvement, (3) make
clear the extent of the state’s authority at the various levels of involve-
ment, and (4) contain criteria for terminating the state’s involve-
ment.23 At least seventy-six state takeovers of school districts have
occurred in the past thirty years, and school districts regularly emerge
from takeovers with increased fiscal stability.24
Although takeovers regularly produce greater fiscal stability in school
districts, they consistently are unable to produce academic gains.25 Ad-
ditionally, local communities often resist state intervention and some-
times express this resistance through litigation.26 I do not intend to sug-
gest that either the resistance or the litigation that flow from a state
takeover are entirely illegitimate, though—takeovers do replace elected
officials in whole or in part with an agent appointed by the state, and the
proper balance between state and local control is an important and con-
troversial issue.
20. Id. at 924.
21. This is sometimes referred to as receivership, although it is different than the
statutory authorization of a judicially imposed receivership. Thus, I designate this
type of intervention as a takeover.
22. Bowman, supra note 1, at 925.
23. Id. at 926-27; see Anderson, supra note 9, at 584.
24. See Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, State Takeovers of School Dis-
tricts: Race and the Equal Protection Clause, 42 IND. L. REV. 343, 363-94 (2009). The
takeover of public school districts in Detroit, Highland Park, and Muskegon Heights
occurred after the publication of this article. That brings the total to 76, by my count,
not including takeovers since 2009 in states other than Michigan.
25. Bowman, supra note 1, at 927.
26. Id. at 927-30; see cases cited infra Part I.B.2.
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B. 1988-Present: Michigan’s School District
Takeover Legislation, Application, and Litigation
1. THE LEGISLATION
Since the late 1980s, four Michigan statutes have regulated state inter-
vention in local governments in fiscal crisis.27 The first, the Local
Government Fiscal Responsibility Act,28 was enacted in 1988. It cre-
ated Michigan’s fiscal crisis early warning system and gave the state
more extensive and clearer authority to intervene in fiscally troubled
municipalities.29 The 1988 statute did not apply to school districts,
prompting a state senator to introduce a bill in 1989 that would repeal
the statute and “re-enact it under the same name, containing virtually
identical language for local units of government but adding similar
provisions for school districts.”30
Proponents of the second piece of legislation contended that the
state’s existing means of monitoring and addressing school districts’
fiscal difficulties were “inadequate” because the state could require
a district to submit a plan for eliminating a deficit, but the only sanc-
tion the state could impose on a district that failed to comply was with-
holding the per-pupil state allocation in whole or in part.31 The then-
existing state statutory and regulatory framework did not permit any
earlier, or any other, involvement by the state.32 The need for state in-
volvement was not abstract—nearly thirty school districts had a deficit
in the 1988-1989 school year, including the Detroit Public Schools,
which had a deficit of about $150 million that amounted to 19% of
its operating expenses.33 The bill introduced in 1989 became the
state’s second municipal takeover statute in 1990 and has since been
known in Michigan as Public Act 72.
27. The most recent statute was signed into law as this article was going to press.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
28. 1988 Mich. Pub. Acts 101 (repealed in 1990).
29. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1101 (repealed in 1990); MICH. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY,
FIRST BILL ANALYISIS OF S.B. 175 (1989).
30. MICH. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, FIRST BILL ANALYISIS OF S.B. 175, at 2.
31. See id. at 1. Although withholding funding may seem to be a draconian mea-
sure that would penalize a financially troubled school district, this is the same remedy
that provides the federal government with substantial authority to enforce compliance
with Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1972). It
does not appear, however, as though Michigan’s involvement in school districts’ fiscal
crises was anywhere as extensive or effective as the federal government’s Title IX
enforcement.
32. See MICH. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, FIRST BILL ANALYISIS OF S.B. 175, at 1.
33. Id. at 1.
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Public Act 72 contained three parts. Article I explained the necessity
of the program and the valid public purpose underlying it; Article II
reenacted the 1988 statute under the section heading “Governmental
Provisions”; Article III adapted the substance of Article II for school
districts and was titled “School District Provisions.”34 Article III con-
tained a series of detailed procedures regulating state involvement in
financially troubled school districts, beginning with limited state in-
volvement—primarily investigation, and the potential negotiation of
a consent agreement between the district and the state—and, if a finan-
cial emergency did not abate, ultimately escalating to the appointment
of an emergency financial manager.35 The state superintendent of pub-
lic instruction was involved throughout all stages of state intervention;
for example, although the governor appointed the emergency financial
manager, the governor chose that person from a short list provided by
the state board of education, and the state board selected its candidates
from a longer list provided by the state superintendent of public in-
struction.36 The emergency financial manager’s authority was delin-
eated in the statute and included actions specific to school districts
such as recommending school district consolidation to the governor.37
The manager’s authority was substantial: it included the “authority and
responsibilities affecting the financial condition of the school district
that are prescribed by law to the school board and superintendent of
the school district” and the ability to authorize the school district to
proceed in a Chapter 9 federal bankruptcy.38
Proponents of Public Act 72 contended that the statute would give
the state a series of progressive steps that would constitute a meaning-
ful way to help both local governments and school districts maintain
their solvency.39 This authority was, and is, especially important in
school districts because, as the legislative history notes, “educational
reform cannot be achieved in an environment of educational insol-
vency.”40 Opponents of Public Act 72 contended that the legislation
undermined local control and reduced or eliminated the public’s role
in, and knowledge about, the operations of local government.41
34. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1231-44 (Public Act 72 was repealed following the
2012 election).
35. Id. §§ 141.1233-35, .1238, .1242.
36. Id.
37. Id. § 141.1241.
38. Id. §§ 141.1241(2)(t), 141.1241(3).
39. MICH. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, FIRST BILL ANALYISIS OF S.B. 175, at 1.
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id.
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These arguments were magnified in 2011 when a state representa-
tive introduced a proposal to repeal Public Act 72 and implement
new fiscal accountability measures for municipalities and school dis-
tricts.42 This bill, the Local Government and School District Financial
Accountability Act, became effective on March 16, 2011. It was the
state’s third municipal takeover statute, known in Michigan as Public
Act 4.43
Public Act 4 differed from Public Act 72 in many ways.44 Although
Public Act 4 contained many controversial provisions, some aspects of
Public Act 4 were improvements to Public Act 72. First, Public Act 4
contained specific criteria for determining whether a local government,
including a school district, was in severe financial stress, in mild finan-
cial stress, or under no financial stress.45 Second, it contained measures
that required more frequent and extensive public reporting by an emer-
gency manager.46 Public Act 4 also retained a basic principle from Pub-
lic Act 72: state intervention escalates over time.47
What was most controversial about Public Act 4 was reflected in the
change of title from “emergency financial manager” to “emergency
manager”; thus, Public Act 4 vested substantially more authority in
managers than Public Act 72 had.48 Under Public Act 4, when a school
district was under emergency management, neither the school board
nor the superintendent could “exercise any of the powers of those of-
fices except as may be specifically authorized in writing by the emer-
gency manager and are subject to any conditions required by the emer-
gency manager.”49 Instead, the emergency manager could “[e]xercise
42. H.B. 4214, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011) (suspended pending the outcome
of the Nov. 6 referendum on Proposal 1).
43. Id.
44. There is also a substantial structural change that appears to make almost no dif-
ference in substance: Public Act 4 contains one set of rules and procedures to govern
municipalities and school districts alike, with some parallel sub-provisions for munic-
ipalities and school districts and one short additional section for school districts alone.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1520; see, e.g., id. § 141.1512(2)(o)-(p). Public Act 4
does not explicitly allow an emergency manager (“EM”) to recommend to the gover-
nor that school districts consolidate. Nevertheless, this appears to be the only way in
which a school district EM’s authority is more limited under Public Act 4 than under
Public Act 72.
45. Id. § 141.1514; see Anderson, supra note 9, at 586-87.
46. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1522; see also Anderson, supra note 9, at 587-88 (dis-
cussing the “financial and operating plan” the emergency manager is required to pre-
sent to the public).
47. See STATE OF MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, How a Financial Emergency Works,
MICHIGAN.GOV, http://www.michigan.gov/treasury/0,1607,7-121-1751_51556-198770—,
00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
48. Anderson, supra note 9, at 588-89, 591.
49. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1515(4).
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the authority and responsibilities affecting the financial condition of
the school district that are prescribed by law to the school board and
superintendent of the school district.”50 This included “issu[ing] to the
appropriate local elected and appointed officials and employees . . . or-
ders for the timely and satisfactory implementation of a financial and
operating plan . . . including an academic and educational plan for a
school district.”51 Additionally, the emergency manager could unilat-
erally modify collective bargaining agreements,52 suspend collective
bargaining for up to five years, and remove all pension board members
if the pension plan is not sufficiently funded.53 These changes and oth-
ers were summarized in a provision toward the end of Public Act 4,
which stipulated that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this act . . .
the authority of the chief administrative officer and governing body
to exercise power for and on behalf of the local government under law,
charter, and ordinance shall be suspended and vested in the emergency
manager.”54
In addition to expanding the authority of emergency managers, Pub-
lic Act 4 gave the governor substantially greater autonomy when
appointing emergency managers than the governor had under Public
Act 72. Under Public Act 72, the emergency financial assistance
loan board appointed an emergency financial manager for a municipal-
ity,55 and the governor appointed an emergency financial manager for
a school district with the advice and consent of the state senate after
provided with input from the state superintendent and the state board
of education.56 Under Public Act 4, the governor appointed emergency
managers for municipalities and school districts without the advice and
consent of the senate and without input required from other government
officials, elected or appointed.57
2. APPLICATION AND LITIGATION
Between 1990 and 2011, when Public Act 72 was in force, emergency
financial managers were appointed in seven municipalities and in one
50. Id. § 141.1241(2)(t).
51. Id. § 141.1517(1); see also id. § 141.1518(1)(e) (explaining, among other re-
quirements, the financial and operating plan shall provide an academic and educa-
tional plan for school districts).
52. Id. § 141.1519(1)(k).
53. Id. § 141.1519(1)(m).
54. Id. § 141.1519(2).
55. Id. § 141.1218.
56. Id. § 141.1238 (1).
57. Id. § 141.1515(4).
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school district: Detroit Public Schools.58 Emergency financial manag-
ers’ authority was often contested publicly and sometimes even in
court.59 At least two lawsuits involved the Detroit Public Schools’
2009-2011 emergency financial manager Robert Bobb, who acted
under the authority of Public Act 72. In the first lawsuit, Bobb’s com-
pensation was challenged because his salary was subsidized in part by
the Eli Broad Foundation, and the circuit court held that the salary sub-
sidy was valid.60 In the second lawsuit, the Detroit Public Schools
Board of Education sued Bobb, claiming that he had exceeded his au-
thority by making academic decisions and seeking to enjoin him from
doing so in the future.61 The school board initially won in the circuit
court under Public Act 72.62
Bobb’s successor, Detroit Public Schools emergency manager Roy
Roberts, was also involved in litigation. First, unions representing De-
troit teachers, paraprofessionals, and office employees challenged the
provision of Public Act 4 that gave emergency managers authority to
unilaterally change collective bargaining agreements, and the case was
ultimately settled.63 Second, an individual requested that the Michigan
Attorney General oust Roberts from his office because Roberts had not
taken an oath of office in a timely manner.64 This matter eventually
58. State of Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, Past Financial Emergency Information,
MICHIGAN.GOV, http://www.michigan.gov/treasury/0,4679,7-121-1751_51556-253021—,
00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2012); State of Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, Emergency Man-
ager Information, MICHIGAN.GOV, http://www.michigan.gov/treasury/0,1607,7-121-
1751_51556-201116—,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
59. See, e.g., Davis v. Emergency Manager for the Detroit Pub. Sch., 810 N.W.2d
555 (Mich. 2012); Highland Park Policemen & Firemen Retirement Sys. v. City of
Highland Park, 725 N.W.2d 460 (Mich. 2007); Porter v. City of Highland Park, 724
N.W.2d 282 (Mich. 2006); Mixon v. City of Highland Park, No. 280637, 2009 WL
638201 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2009); Rutherford v. City of Flint, No. 271124,
2007 WL 2743631 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2007); AFSCME Council 25 v. City
of Highland Park, No. 257680, 2006 WL 657114 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2006); At-
torney General v. City of Flint, 713 N.W.2d 782 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); Ryner v. City
of Hamtramck, No. 241473, 2003 WL 22681424 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2003).
60. Erik Kain, Michigan Emergency Manager Robert Bobb Issues Layoff Notice to
All Detroit Public School Teachers, FORBES (Apr. 19, 2011, 12:59 PM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/04/19/michigan-emergency-manager-robert-bobb-issues-
layoff-notice-to-all-detroit-public-school-teachers/; Bobb can get pay from foundations,
judge rules, DETROIT NEWS, May 22, 2010, at A5.
61. Mark Brush & Jennifer Guerra, Detroit Board of Education wins lawsuit
against Robert Bobb, MICHIGAN RADIO (Dec. 6, 2010, 5:15 PM), http://michiganradio.
org/post/detroit-board-education-wins-lawsuit-against-robert-bobb.
62. Judge gives Robert Bobb total return of Detroit Public Schools due to new fi-
nancial manager law, MLIVE (Mar. 19, 2011, 10:02 AM), http://www.mlive.com/
news/detroit/index.ssf/2011/03/judge_gives_robert_bobb_total.html.
63. Jennifer Chambers, Roberts gives DPS staffers bonuses, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 1,
2012, at A1.
64. See Davis, 810 N.W.2d 555.
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came before the Michigan Supreme Court, but by that time Governor
Rick Snyder had reappointed Roberts to the position, and Roberts im-
mediately took an oath of office.65 Third, Roberts decided to shift fif-
teen Detroit Public Schools—containing about 7,000 students—to a
statewide school district composed of the state’s poorest-performing
schools.66 The school board contested that decision in court, but the
decision was upheld.67 The teachers’ union stated that it may sue to
contest the termination of 400 union employees under a process estab-
lished by the emergency manager, but as of late 2012, no suit was
filed.68
After the enactment of Public Act 4, emergency managers were ap-
pointed to oversee two additional school districts, Highland Park and
Muskegon Heights.69 Highland Park School District exists as a figura-
tive island in the middle of Detroit, while Muskegon Heights School
District is located adjacent to the city of Muskegon on the west side
of the state. Both districts have since turned over their academic pro-
grams to charter school companies.70 In both districts, this decision
was made by the emergency manager alone.71 A Highland Park school
board member who is himself the subject of federal corruption charges
described this decision as essentially “dissolving the [school] district”
and asked the Michigan Court of Appeals, in a separate ongoing
lawsuit, to remove Highland Park’s emergency manager.72 State Board
members expressed concern about the pattern of school districts under
emergency management becoming districts of charter schools.73
65. Id. at 555.
66. Jennifer Chambers, For DPS, no more ‘one size fits all’, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 4,
2012, at A5.
67. Jennifer Chambers, Judge: 15 failing DPS schools must stay in EAA, DETROIT
NEWS, Aug. 15, 2012, at A1.
68. See Jennifer Chambers, Roberts gives DPS staffers bonuses, DETROIT NEWS,
Sept. 1, 2012, at A1.
69. Id.
70. Shawn D. Lewis, Highland Park Schools in Focus as Charter Takes Over,
DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 22, 2012, at A1.
71. Lynn Moore, Muskegon Heights Emergency Manager: Charter School District
Unaffected by Supreme Court Ruling, MLIVE (Aug. 3, 2012, 4:32 PM), http://www.
mlive.com/news/muskegon/index.ssf/2012/08/muskegon_heights_emergency_man.html.
72. Jennifer Chambers, Charter may control Highland Park schools, DETROIT
NEWS, June 19, 2012, at A3; Robert Davis, Highland Park School Board Member,
Faces More Charges from U.S. Attorney’s Office, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (May 21,
2012, 1:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/21/robert-davis-highland-
parks-school-board-corruption-charges_n_1533065.html.
73. Dave Murray, Emergency manager recommends Highland Park become a
charter school district, as state educators fear plan will spread to others, MLIVE
(June 18, 2012, 5:52 PM), http://www.mlive.com/education/index.ssf/2012/06/
emergency_manager_recommends_h.html.
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During this time, other litigation challenged whether a governor-
appointed financial review team was a public body subject to the open
meetings act (an appellate court held in 2012 that it was not);74 whether
the state could refuse certain discovery requests in a case that challenged
the facial validity of the law (an appellate court held in 2012 that it
could);75 and—most significantly—whether a petition to initiate a public
recall of Public Act 4 by placing the question on the November 2012
ballot complied with statutory requirements about the petition’s typeface
(the Michigan Supreme Court held in Stand Up for Democracy v. Sec-
retary of State that it did).76 The petition contained 203,238 valid signa-
tures, far in excess of the number required for a ballot recall.77
The Michigan Supreme Court issued its Stand Up for Democracy
decision on Friday, August 3, 2012,78 putting the recall question on
the November 2012 ballot. Three days later, on Monday, August 6,
2012, Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette issued an advisory
opinion concluding that Public Act 4 was suspended until the results
of the November 2012 ballot referendum were certified.79 In the in-
terim, Public Act 72 was “temporarily revived.” Furthermore, the At-
torney General opined that if the voters were to nullify Public Act 4,
which included a legislative repeal of Public Act 72, then Public Act
72 would be permanently revived.80 A lawsuit subsequently chal-
lenged the Attorney General’s advisory opinion, arguing that the effect
of staying Public Act 4 was not to revive Public Act 72, but rather to
leave the state without an emergency manager statute.81 Eight days
after the Attorney General’s advisory opinion was issued, a circuit
court judge held that the then-temporarily-revived Public Act 72
vested power in the Detroit Public Schools’ board and superintendent
74. Davis v. Fin. Review Team, Nos. 309218, 309250, 309482, 2012 WL 1836854
(Mich. Ct. App. May 21, 2012).
75. Brown v. Treasurer of Michigan, No. 307291, 2012 WL 2402576 (Mich. Ct.
App. June 26, 2012).
76. Stand Up for Democracy v. Secretary of State, 822 N.W.2d 159 (Mich. 2012).
77. Id. at 161.
78. Id. at 159.
79. See Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, Op.
Att’y. Gen. (Mich. 2012) No. 7267, available at http://www.ag.state.mi.us/opinion/
datafiles/2010s/op10346.htm.
80. See id.
81. Jonathan Oosting, Michigan’s Old Emergency Financial Manager Law ‘is
Dead,’ According to New Lawsuit, MLIVE, http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/
2012/09/michigans_old_emergency_financ.html#incart_river_default (last visited
Nov 15, 2012).
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to exercise control over the district’s academics, and gave the emer-
gency manager control over the district’s finances.82
On November 6, 2012, Michigan voters voted to rescind Public Act
4 via a ballot referendum by a slim margin; 52% of the votes cast were
in favor of rescinding, 48% were against.83 Under the Attorney Gen-
eral’s advisory opinion, Public Act 72 was then reinstated, though this
reinstatement was brief. During the Michigan legislature’s lame duck
session in mid-December 2012, the legislature passed the state’s fourth
emergency manager statute. On December 26, 2012, the governor
signed the bill into law.84
II. Lessons from Michigan
As the long stream of litigation and the successful ballot recall effort
make clear, Public Act 4 was the subject of substantial resistance by
Michigan citizens. Even though Public Act 4 was rescinded in Novem-
ber 2012, various states—including Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, and
Rhode Island—continue to actively examine the role they should play
in local governments’ and school districts’ fiscal crises.85 Thus, it is
still important to consider what we can learn from Public Act 4 about
best practices for state intervention in school districts mired in fiscal
crisis.
A. Comprehensive Takeover Triggered by Financial
Crisis Alone
Some states’ statutes permit a state to engage in a comprehensive ac-
ademic and fiscal takeover of a local school district.86 When a compre-
hensive takeover occurs, it is common for that takeover to be triggered
by both the district’s financial shortcomings and its academic inade-
quacies.87 Public Act 72 authorized fiscal takeovers, and as such, it
only considered a district’s fiscal situation when considering whether
state involvement was appropriate.88 Public Act 4 contained more spe-
82. Chambers, supra note 67.
83. Paul Egan, After Emergency Manager Law Repeal, Any New Legislation Will
Be Balancing Act, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 8, 2012, http://www.freep.com/article/
20121108/NEWS15/311080112/After-emergency-manager-law-repeal-any-new-legisla
tion-will-be-balancing-act.
84. Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 436.
85. See Egan, supra note 11.
86. Bowman, supra note 1, at 925.
87. See generally MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-17-6, 37-18-7 (2012); (Mississippi’s take-
over statute); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 69 § 1J, 1K (2012); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. § 2.01-
2.06, 2.03 (2012) (Massachusetts’s takeover statute).
88. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1233.
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cific criteria than Public Act 72 did for determining whether a district
is in fiscal crisis, and it continued to focus on a district’s fiscal situa-
tion when deciding whether a takeover is appropriate. Under Public
Act 4, however, a district’s fiscal crisis alone triggered a comprehen-
sive takeover.89 Fiscal crisis and academic crisis often do go hand in
hand,90 but a high correlation between the two does not justify using a
district’s fiscal crisis to trigger a comprehensive takeover. A funda-
mental legal principle is that a remedy should be tailored to the viola-
tion.91 Moreover, education is, as the United States Supreme Court
stated in Brown v. Board of Education, “perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments.”92 To remove local control
over a district’s educational program without evaluating the quality
of that academic program is to unfairly impose a radical executive
branch remedy for a violation that has not been proven.
B. Where Do Finances Stop and Academics Begin?
In the past three years, the Detroit Public Schools’ board of education
sued two different emergency managers, contesting each manager’s
authority over academic affairs.93 Under Public Act 72, the school
board and superintendent had authority over academics and the emer-
gency financial manager had authority over finances; the division was
straightforward but, as a circuit court judge who adjudicated one of
these cases noted, “the devil is in the details.”94 Under Public Act 4,
school districts’ emergency financial managers had comprehensive au-
thority over districts “academic plan[s]” as well as their finances. The
question of authority thus had a clear-cut answer under Public Act 4,
but easy answers are not always the best solution.
School districts are local government entities whose primary pur-
pose is education. Emergency managers of school districts may or
89. Id. § 141.1518.
90. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 925. For example, Highland Park, Michigan, is
the subject of a “right to read” lawsuit recently initiated by the ACLU. Lori Higgins,
ACLU Attorneys, state agree to Dec. 5 hearing in Right to Read Lawsuit, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (Nov. 1, 2012, 1:17PM), http://www.freep.com/article/20121101/NEWS06/
121101008/right-to-read-students-Highland-Park-Michigan; Am. Civil Liberties Union,
Highland Park Students File Class-Action “Right to Read” Lawsuit, ACLU.ORG (July
12, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/human-rights/highland-park-students-file-class-action-
right-read-lawsuit.
91. See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009).
92. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
93. See supra Part I.B.
94. Vanessa Evans, Wayne County Judge Rules Roberts to Lose Academic Control
Over DPS, YAHOO! CONTRIBUTOR NETWORK (Aug. 15, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/
wayne-county-judge-rules-roberts-lose-academic-control-165900361.html.
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may not be well-versed in the pedagogical advantages and disadvan-
tages of various academic policies, but their foremost function, even
under Public Act 4, is to bring financial stability to a district; therefore,
managers should have both municipal finance and budgetary expertise.
Some changes a manager may make are clearly non-academic: expos-
ing corruption, streamlining administrative operations, and contracting
out non-academic services will not affect a district’s educational mis-
sion.95 Those types of changes, however, can only take a manager so
far. Sooner or later, discussion will turn to topics regarding the dis-
trict’s instructional program, such as class size, length of school year,
curriculum and materials. At a certain level, this discussion is appropri-
ate because a manager should push a district to reevaluate whether the
district is getting the most academic bang for its buck. Yet, classifying a
policy change as financial or academic is difficult and sometimes im-
possible. The following excerpt from a 2010 Time magazine article
about former Detroit Public Schools and emergency financial manager
Robert Bobb illustrates the overlap:
Bobb acknowledges that cost-shaving measures have made some high school class-
rooms “look like lecture halls.” They have also raised the potential for clashes be-
tween students from rival schools and neighborhoods suddenly thrown together
under the same roof; as a result 137 guidance counselors cut by Bobb were later
hired back. Bobb had a similar change of heart after 20 piano teachers were dis-
missed. “You go back to your apartment and think, how can you have a school
of music without a piano teacher?” Bobb says. So he hired them back too. Barbara
Byrd-Bennett, Bobb’s chief academic officer and a former CEO of Cleveland’s pub-
lic schools, says she often greeted Bobb’s proposed cuts with a single question:
“Is this good for the kids?”96
To answer that question, a manager ideally would work cooperatively
with the school board, superintendent, and administrative staff—people
who have devoted years and careers to a school district and who have
a long-term investment in the education that district provides. But a
cooperative relationship between a manager and the superintendent/
board rarely seems to develop, and a manager is left making decisions
about academics without the benefit of the people in the district who
may know the district, and the education, better than the manager.
A constant stream of litigation often results. Even though granting
managers complete authority over a school district’s academics—as
95. Emergency financial managers can be corrupt, though, as well. See People v.
Blackwell, No. 302473, 2012 WL 2579680 (Mich. Ct. App. July 3, 2012).
96. Steven Gray, Can Robert Bobb Fix Detroit’s Public Schools?, TIME, Jan. 25,
2010, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1953694,00.
html.
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Public Act 4 required—would end that stream of litigation, that broad
grant of authority can result in dangerous consequences.
For example, as previously mentioned, two Michigan school dis-
tricts under the control of emergency managers became districts of
charter schools during summer 2012. In both districts, the decision
to convert all public schools to charter schools was made by the emer-
gency manager alone—not by the superintendent, not by the school
board. Admittedly this is a financially creative approach because the
charter schools will operate on state funding alone while the local prop-
erty tax revenues will be applied to each school district’s debt.97
But, these decisions demonstrate what Michelle Wilde Anderson has
termed “democratic dissolution”: a local government’s “municipal cor-
porate form” is preserved, but its self-rule is “functionally dissolve
[d].”98 Public Act 72 did not go so far that it essentially dissolved the
local government aspect of public education. Public Act 4 did, and
the consequences of this remain visible in Highland Park and Muskegon
Heights.
C. The Students in the School Districts in
Fiscal Crisis
In Michigan, and quite likely in other states, school districts subject to
state takeover are not a random sample of all of the districts across the
state. The general municipalities under emergency managers’ author-
ity in Michigan are disproportionately full of African-American citi-
zens.99 The Michigan school districts under emergency managers’
control share this disparate impact, which may be particularly troubling
given our nation’s history of disenfranchising African-Americans.100
Table 1 provides the most recent demographics not only for the three
now-taken-over districts, but also for all Michigan public schools.
97. Dave Murray, Emergency Manager Recommends Highland Park Become A
Charter School District, as State Educators Fear Plan Will Spread to Others,
MLIVE ( June 18, 2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.mlive.com/education/index.ssf/2012/
06/emergency_manager_recommends_h.html.
98. Anderson, supra note 9, at 600.
99. Id. at 590.
100. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–73aa (prohibiting racial
restrictions on voting and enacted originally in 1965); see also South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 327 (1966) (describing the history of disenfranchise-
ment that led up to the Voting Rights Act); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 199-200 (2009) (detailing reauthorizations and measures to con-
tinue to reduce voting rights disparities since 1965).
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Enrollments in all three districts are falling—and that is part of the
problem, that each district receives less total state funding year after
year because state funding is allocated primarily on a per capita
basis,101 and districts’ debt mounts. When the 2011-2012 school
year ended, the Muskegon Heights District had 1,331 students and
the Highland Park District had 969 students.102 When the 2012-2013
school year began, Detroit Public Schools were projected to have
about 52,000 students103. Even though the enrollments are falling, it
is highly unlikely that these three districts are becoming substantially
more diverse. Thus, the 2010-2011 district demographics can be con-
sidered a rough approximation of the districts’ current racial/ethnic
composition. In 2010-2011, students in the three districts now under
the authority of emergency financial managers comprised 5% of all
Michigan public school students, including 9% of the state’s students
in poverty, as measured by those who receive a free or reduced
lunch,104 and 23% of the state’s African-American students.105 This
data can lead to a variety of conclusions. On one hand, if roughly a
quarter of the state’s African-American students are in school districts
that are in fiscal crisis, it would be unacceptable for the state to ignore
those districts. On the other hand, the reality is that Public Act 4 per-
mitted emergency managers so much authority over school districts
that one emergency manager alone could turn control of a district’s
101. Bowman, supra note 1, at 902; K-12 Funding, MICHIGAN IN BRIEF, (Mich. Non-
profit Ass’n & The Council of Mich. Founds, Lansing, Mich.), Apr. 1, 2002, at 168,
available at http://www.michiganinbrief.org/edition07/Chapter5/Chapter5_Files/27-
K-12_Funding.pdf.
102. Murray, supra note 73 (Muskegon Heights); 3 Appointed to Aid Highland Park
District’s Transition to Charter District, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 27, 2012, http://www.
freep.com/article/20120727/NEWS02/120727033/3-appointed-to-aid-Highland-Park-
district-s-transition-to-charter-district (Highland Park).
103. See Corey Williams, DPS Interim Superintendent Waiting for PA4 Defeat,
THE DETROIT NEWS, (Aug. 26, 2012) (on file with THE URBAN LAWYER) (discussing
superintendent’s wait for PA4’s defeat, which would result in emergency manager’s
relinquishment of power). Not all of the decrease in Detroit was pure attrition—a sub-
stantial number of students formerly counted as Detroit Public School students now
are in schools turned over to a special school district created by the state. See Christina
A. Samuels, K.C. Schools Chief to Run ‘Reform’ District, EDUCATION WEEK, Sept. 14,
2011, http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/11/28/13kc.h31.html?tkn=SLXFmbVpmZ
%2BRW6B0kL0g6%2FdygGctJxhLo3GB (reporting John Covington’s move to the Edu-
cation Achievement System created under by emergency manager Roy Roberts).
104. Food and Nutrition Service, Eligibility Guidelines (IEGs), UNITED STATES
DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/governance/notices/iegs/iegs.htm (last
visited Nov. 20, 2012) (determining eligibility for free and reduced price meals and
are used by schools that participate in the National School Lunch Program and School
Breakfast Program, among others).
105. See supra Table I.
State Takeovers of School Districts 17
schools over to charter school operators. While that may be a choice
that the school board or superintendent would make, it should not
be a decision forced on students—especially students who are dispro-
portionately African-American and Latino—without any involvement
by elected officials or the professional educators they select. Both
extremes are incredibly problematic, but they are not the only options.
Public Act 72 provided more of a middle ground.
D. The Governor’s Appointment Authority
Under Public Act 72, the state superintendent and the state board of
education respectively whittled down a list of nominees for emergency
financial manager of a school district, and the governor made the final
selection. Under Public Act 4, the governor could appoint the emer-
gency manager for a school district without consulting with either
the state board or the state superintendent, and without any regard
for those officeholders’ preferred candidates.106
Like other aspects of Public Act 4, this part of Public Act 4 also
squeezed out professional educators and those who were elected to
make decisions about public education, including the state’s chief ed-
ucational officer. This time, however, it was state level officials who
were excluded from the process of the state takeover rather than just
local level officials. Furthermore, Public Act 4 eliminated the require-
ment that emergency managers were appointed with the advice and
consent of the state senate. There was no check on who the governor
appointed to serve as a school district’s emergency manager, and the
procedural loss was significant. Coupling these changes in how emer-
gency managers were selected with the provision that expanded emer-
gency managers’ authority to include academic matters illustrates that
the four changes discussed in this section, working in tandem, under-
mined public education in Michigan.
III. Conclusion
School districts such as those in Detroit, Highland Park, and Muske-
gon Heights faced fiscal crisis. They needed outside help and, through
Michigan’s state takeover statutes, they received some. But, did Public
Act 4 require that districts receive too much “help”? I contend here
106. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1241(2)(t) (allowing the emergency manager to “ex-
ercise the authority and responsibilities affecting the financial condition of the school
district that are prescribed by law to the school board and superintendent of the school
district”).
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that it did, and that other states would be wise to learn from Michi-
gan’s legislative and political story. States should not leave school dis-
tricts in fiscal crisis to fend for themselves. States also should be mind-
ful of the strong tradition of local control over education, and what is
often still a strong local investment in public schools by elected board
members, appointed superintendents, parents, community members,
and, of course, life-long educators. If public schools are to continue
to be anchors for our communities, then state and especially local
level educators and elected educational officials should not be
completely cut out of the process of reforming them.107
107. See, e.g., David Arsen & Mary L. Mason, Seeking Accountability Through
State-Appointed Emergency District Management (Educ. Policy Ctr. at Mich. State
Univ., Working Paper No. 28, 2012), available at http://education.msu.edu/epc/
publications/documents/WP28Seekingaccountability11812_000.pdf.
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